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Institutionalizing 
torture in Israel: 
The Firas Tbeish 
decision. 
A commentary  
by John W. 
Schiemann, PhD*
Efrat Shir’s article in this volume, “How 
do you say IP in Hebrew? The case of Mr. 
Firas Tbeish,’’ provides a valuable service 
by documenting the difficulties surrounding 
the recognition of the Istanbul Protocol by 
the Israeli Supreme Court, in a discussion of 
the court’s 2018 ruling in Firas Tbeish v. The 
Attorney General (FT). Shir rightly notes that 
the court’s “reasoning behind the decision 
was … disturbing.” In the course of her 
analysis she raises two important questions:
1. “How does one prove … [having been 
tortured when] … interrogations are not 
recorded, medical files are lacking and 
interrogees’ rights frequently ignored?”
2. “If an IP assessment is not significant, 
how can claims that interrogational 
methods cause great pain and suffering 
be established?’’
The implicit answers to these questions from 
the state of Israel are: 1. “one can’t” and 2. 
“they can’t” respectively.
Shir’s examination explains the 
background to these responses by revealing 
the systematic efforts by both the government 
of Israel and its highest judicial body to 
institutionalize torture. On the one hand, 
the government, Shir notes, “has neither 
outlawed nor defined torture in domestic 
legislation” yet has crafted secret guidelines 
to regularize its use. On the other hand, 
the Supreme Court pursues its own 
three-pronged strategy that effectively 
institutionalizes torture, something Shir 
shows in part by referring briefly to another 
case brought by The Public Committee 
Against Torture in Israel (PCATI), As’ad Abu 
Gosh et al. v the Attorney General et al. (2017). 
First, the court simply ignores certain 
claims (e.g. cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment) and evidence (e.g. psychological 
trauma) entirely. Second, it treats the 
absence of evidence of torture in the form 
of ISA medical records as evidence of the 
absence of torture. Such rulings sustain 
a system that “overtly views torture as 
physical and expects visible damage” and so 
provides further incentive to ISA officials to 
simply not record any injuries from abuse. 
Third, the court not only fails to “train its 
own investigators and judges” in the IP, but 
also actively “disparage[s]” and dismisses 
its evidentiary weight by referencing the 
(necessary) lapse of time between torture 
and IP examination on the one hand, and 
discounting statements by the victim on the 
other hand.
Several additional aspects of the 
court’s decision weaken existing minimal 
restraints on torture in Israel and are 
certain to encourage its continued use 
and likely expansion: attempts at legal and 
normative justifications for torture, further 
bureaucratization of torture, and providing 
ex ante legal cover.
Attempts at legal and normative 
justifications for torture
The FT decision raises profound concerns 
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about the legal and normative justification 
for torture by the Israeli state. There are 
two issues with the legal justification. 
First, the decision equates the successful 
elicitation of information under torture 
with its lawfulness. In several places the 
decision states very explicitly that the 
abuse was legally justified by the successful 
elicitation of information (FT, paras 
9,26,59). On this view any torture can 
be justified if it results in information. 
The court avoided addressing whether 
torture is justified if it fails to generate 
information, but there are two possibilities: 
either torture is justified despite the failure 
or it is not. The former position would 
“give a green light” to torturing under 
any conditions because it is justified even 
if little or no information is elicited. If, 
on the other hand, the court holds that 
the failure to elicit information means 
the torture was unjustified, it has the 
perverse effect of directly contradicting 
the court’s own rationale and justification 
for torture where the detainee actually 
had information but refused to divulge the 
known information despite the torture.
The second problem as concerns 
legal justification is the court’s finding 
that the torture was lawful because the 
means “were proportionate relative to the 
serious threat” (FT, para 59; also Justice I. 
Amit concurring, para 2). Here, the court 
creates new law without factual grounding. 
Israel is party to the Convention against 
Torture, which thus has binding legal force. 
Paragraph two of Article two explicitly 
states that “[n]o exceptional circumstances 
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a 
threat of war, internal political instability or 
any other public emergency, may be invoked 
as a justification of torture.” There is nothing 
in this provision, nor anywhere else in the 
treaty, that comes close to mentioning, let 
alone providing, exculpatory exceptions 
related to proportionality. 
Nor can the court find support in its 
own 1999 landmark decision outlawing 
torture in Public Committee against Torture v. 
State of Israel (PCATI). That decision refers 
to proportionality but only in the context of 
the possibility for an investigator to claim a 
necessity defense after the fact, whilst very 
explicitly not making the abuse itself lawful.
Moreover, even here, the language of the 
1999 decision respects the non-derogable 
character of the prohibition by explicitly 
noting that the proportionality must never 
rise to the level of torture. In the court’s 
1999 language, “an investigator who, in 
the face of such danger, applies a degree of 
physical pressure, which does not constitute 
abuse or torture of the suspect, but is 
proportionate to the danger to human life 
can, in the face of criminal liability, avail 
himself of the ‘necessity defense’” (PCATI, 
para 16). The decision goes on (PCATI, para 
23) to reaffirm that “[t]hese prohibitions are 
“absolute.” There are no exceptions to them 
and there is no room for balancing.” 
In addition to ignoring the treaty to 
which it is a party and making up its own 
law, the court’s decision also begs the 
question as to whether a bigger perceived 
threat would justify measures even the 
Israeli court would deem torture. Indeed, 
at least one justice -- D. Mintz -- already 
seems to thinks so, given a passing remark 
in his concurring opinion “that torture is 
prohibited, apart from extremely exceptional 
cases,” despite the fact that torture is 
absolutely prohibited in Israeli law (FT, 
para 3). A follow up ruling on the same case 
(HCJ 9105/18) by the Chief Justice noting 
that Mintz’s comment was “inaccurate” does 
little to assuage such fears.
With respect to the broader normative 
justification, according to this decision 
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not only does the bomb not really need to 
tick, but it may not even be likely to go off. 
Shir correctly notes that the ticking bomb 
hypothetical has been the paradigmatic 
justification—the “necessity defense” in Israeli 
legal terms—for Israeli (and other countries’) 
interrogational torture. The Firas Tbeish 
decision broadens the scope of the necessity 
defense beyond PCATI—which already 
allowed the requirement to be met even when 
the danger may be realized “in a few days, 
or even in a few weeks”—by now weakening 
the requirement that the threat be certain 
(PCATI, para 34). In the words of the court, 
the threat is now “might … cost human lives” 
(FT, para 60) rather than the 1999 decision 
language requiring that ‘‘the danger is certain 
to materialize’’ (PCATI, para 34). In sum, 
both the legal and normative justifications 
in the decision weaken the prohibition on 
torture and increase its likelihood. 
Bureaucratization of torture
The court’s approval of the ISA’s three 
internal torture guidelines discussed in 
the decision effectively serve to further 
bureaucratize torture in Israel. The 
first guideline sets out a consultation 
system permitting superiors to opine 
to subordinates that torture (“special 
measures”) is “immediately required” 
but “who cannot authorize” the torture 
(FT, para 28). In a security agency with 
a quasi-military chain of command, the 
scholastic exercise of differentiating between 
an opinion and an order by a superior 
is artificial, and is a de facto directive to 
torture. Consistent with this reality and 
inconsistent with the guideline’s pretense 
of expressing opinion only, superiors can, 
however, set limits on the torture employed 
according to the second guideline. Thus, 
by setting limits on discretion about when 
to torture, the ISA effectively defines 
the conditions under which it can be 
employed ex ante and so triggers torture 
when those conditions are deemed to have 
been met. The third guideline completes 
the bureaucratization by outlining how 
torture should be memorialized for the 
record. Nothing says bureaucratized like a 
requirement to fill out the proper forms. 
And yet, despite all this, as well as the 
court’s own 1999 finding in PCATI that 
‘the necessity defense’ does not constitute 
a source of authority which would allow 
ISA investigators to make use of physical 
means during the course of interrogations 
(PCATI, paras 36-38), in 2018 the court 
refused to draw the obvious conclusion 
that such a combined system does indeed 
constitute “a predetermined, systematic 
canon” for the use of torture or ‘‘general, 
advance instruction or direction’’ (FT, 
paras 64, 65). Indeed, the court instead 
praised the system for “actually serv[ing] 
to protect the interrogee from an unlawful 
infringement of his rights” and, in the 
words of Justice Mintz, “may moderate 
the very use of” torture and “facilitate 
its better implementation” (FT, para 65; 
Justice D. Mintz, concurring, para 3). This 
is part and parcel of what legal scholar 
David Luban called the “fantasy” of 
“fastidious” and limited torture central to 
the view that torture is compatible with 
liberal democracy because it “can be neatly 
confined to exceptional ticking-bomb cases 
and surgically severed from cruelty and 
tyranny” (Luban 2005, 1452, 1461). The 
actual result, however, is a “torture culture, 
a network of institutions and practices 
that regularize the exception and make 
it standard operating procedure” (Luban 
2005, 1461). In short, together these rules 
enable torturing with impunity by helping 
to systematize a practice the 1999 PCATI 
decision prohibited. 
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Ex ante legal cover
Although the PCATI decision criminalized 
torture, it also left open the possibility for 
ex post facto exoneration if the criteria for 
the necessity defense had been met. This 
exception had already, in Shir’s phrasing, 
“left the door open” to legal torture by 
permitting “the State Attorney General to 
establish his or her own guidelines in regard 
to security interrogations.” The current 
decision throws the door wide open by 
claiming that the necessity defense is not 
merely exculpatory but justificatory. Based 
on a vague reference to “some criminal 
law theories,” “the result of the application 
of the necessity defense is, therefore, not 
merely the exoneration of the actor, but 
also the justification of the act, such that it 
is not defined as a harmful phenomenon 
that the criminal law seeks to prohibit” (FT, 
para 61). This again is creating law without 
grounding in facts and signals ex ante 
legal cover to ISA officials who decide to 
torture, thus incentivizing its continued and 
expanded use. 
Turning a blind eye to torture
In sum, Shir’s article shows that with this 
decision the court signaled that it will 
continue to use the blindfold of justice to 
keep its eyes closed to torture by the ISA, 
whatever the evidence and despite the 
court’s explicit reference to the definition of 
torture in the Convention Against Torture, 
to which Israel is a party. The court simply 
takes witness (interrogators, medical 
personnel, guards) denials of abuse in the 
government’s internal investigations at face 
value (e.g. FT, paras 17,49). The court also 
deems the absence of evidence in medical 
records as the evidence of absence (of 
torture), rather than opening an investigation 
about problems with the documentation 
(FT, para 52). 
Second and in sharp contrast, the court 
treats statements and evidence submitted 
by FT very differently, placing great weight 
on minor inconsistencies in FT’s account 
over time, questioning FT’s inability to 
recall certain details of his torture (a well-
known sequel of torture-induced trauma), 
and his refusal to take a polygraph test 
at that stage of the process (FT, para 
49). Third, the court not only takes at 
face value the claim by ISA interrogators 
that the “scope and nature” of their 
“special interrogation means” “differed 
significantly from” FT’s claims of shaking, 
stress positions like the frog, and sleep 
deprivation, but also fails to provide any 
method or test by which they determined 
that those differences, even if true, were 
sufficient not to constitute torture. Further, 
in FT (para 47), just prior to finding no 
suspicion of criminal offense by the ISA 
in para 48, the court dismissively refers to 
the stress positions “as improper “torture 
methods,” as a mere claim by FT in scare 
quotes when in fact, as Shir states, this was 
the very finding of PCATI: 
“Consequently, it is decided that the 
order nisi be made absolute. The [ISA] 
does not have the authority to “shake” a 
man, hold him in the “Shabach” position 
(which includes the combination of various 
methods, as mentioned in paragraph 30), 
force him into a “frog crouch” position and 
deprive him of sleep in a manner other than 
that which is inherently required by the 
interrogation (PCATI, para 40).”
Parenthetically, note that it is clear by 
the court’s use of “inherent” elsewhere in 
the 1999 decision that it means a possible 
need to question a prisoner when he might 
otherwise sleep and not that successful 
interrogation requires depriving a detainee of 
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sleep in order to “break” him, i.e. deliberate 
sleep deprivation as an interrogation method. 
For example, the court notes that seating 
the prisoner is inherent to the interrogation, 
but seating him in the shabach stress position 
is not inherent to an interrogation and is 
therefore prohibited (PCATI, 1999, para 27). 
Lastly, the injuries to Firas Tbeish and 
his description of the techniques used 
against him (e.g. the “frog” and “banana”) 
are consistent with the by now very well-
established public knowledge of ISA 
torture practices, based not just on detainee 
reports but by human rights groups and 
even interrogator revelations (FT, para 
10; Absolute Prohibition 2007, 67; Amnesty 
International 2016, 23; Levinson 2017). The 
court took the ISA’s claims at face value 
that instances of torture have been sharply 
reduced to a ‘‘tiny percentage” when a 
2015 investigative report by Haaretz and 
the Public Committee Against Torture in 
Israel found that torture by interrogators 
was on the rise (FT, para 44; Levinson 
2015). Despite this, as Shir notes, “of over 
1,200 complaints of torture that have been 
submitted during nearly two decades, no 
ISA interrogator has ever been indicted.”
In her discussion of the court’s dismissal 
of the IP, she says there “is a legal system 
that discredits the IP’s potential while 
digging deeper into its own conception of 
torture.’’ Shir has helped show that this is 
true more broadly of torture, beyond the IP. 
Indeed, I suspect the court may not view the 
IP as a “strange creature” causing “suspicion 
of the unfamiliar.” Instead, it may be by 
now a very familiar creature that threatens 
torture’s impunity in Israel, and what Shir 
shows is that the court has developed a 
systematic strategy to counter it. Torture is 
possible in Israel because the government 
and courts are complicit in deliberately 
creating a legal and institutional black 
hole where boundaries are ill-defined and 
obscure, and no light can shine. 
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